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Periodic price reductions, or price promotions, 
constitute a widely observed phenomenon in retail-
ing. It is difficult to overstate the importance of price 
promotions from both the retailer (recent estimates for 
USA show 58% of all retailer marketing expenditures 
going for sales promotions, Allender and Richards 
2012) and the consumer points of view. Sales oc-
cur on a regular basis, which suggests that they are 
not entirely due to random variations such as the 
shocks to inventory holdings or demand. In recent 
years, the frequency of periodic price reductions has 
increased, indicating that the price promotion has 
become more important for retailers and consum-
ers. Assuming that consumers have some familiarity 
with the complex pricing strategies employed by the 
supermarkets, during the past decades a number of 
competing sale theories were developed to explain 
discounts and price dispersion (e.g. Salop and Stiglitz 
1982; Varian 1980; Sobel 1984; Pesendorfer 2002). 
Many recent papers suggest that most of the retail 
price variation can be explained by the temporary 
price reductions (e.g. Hosken and Reiffen 2004; Li et 
al. 2005). Yet the recently developed theories of sales 
often provide conflicting predictions for many aspects 
of price promotions (e.g. timing of sales, whether 
manufacturers or rather retailers decide on sales, 
pricing strategies followed by retailers etc.). Despite 
of its growing importance – especially when food 
products are considered – only a limited number of 
empirical papers focused on sales and their impact 
upon retail prices (e.g. MacDonald 2000; Pesendorfer 
2002; Chevalier et al. 2003; Berck et al. 2008). The 
choice of a food item of the above mentioned papers 
reflects the need of an universally available homog-
enous product such as orange juice (e.g. Dutta et 
al. 2002; Berck et al. 2008) or ketchup (Pesendorfer 
2002). Although included in baskets of the analysed 
food items by few papers (e.g. Carman and Sexton 
2005; Eichenbaum et al. 2008), we could not find 
examples in the international literature specifically 
focusing on the milk price promotions. Most of the 
related studies employing milk price data focuses on 
analysing the effects of the milk promotion programs 
(generic milk advertising), see for example Lenz et al. 
1988 or more recently, Gvillo et al. 2014 or Tikkanen 
2015. Albeit milk consumption in Hungary follows 
a decreasing trend, from around 170 litres in 2009 
to 155 litre in 2014 for those regularly consuming 
milk (equivalent of 53 litres/cap in 2009 and slightly 
below 50 litres/cap in 2013 when the total population 
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is considered1), the boxed and UHT (durable)2 milk 
still constitute important staples in the populations’ 
diet. More, milk is considered to be often used (along 
with the in-store fresh bakery products) as a cos-
tumer attractor by retailers. The fact that the same 
product, fluid milk, is available in the perishable and 
durable form alike makes it an attractive subject for 
testing empirically the predictions of the existing 
sale theories. To achieve this, we use a wide range 
of quantitative techniques from simple descriptive 
statistics to the correlation analysis of retail specific 
prices, the causality analysis, discrete choice models, 
the co-integration and panel co-integration. Whilst 
the literature on price promotions is abundant, to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no published research 
focusing on empirical testing of sale hypotheses in 
a Central East European Country, with a history of 
the modern type retailing dating back only 25 years. 
COMPETING PRICE PROMOTION 
THEORIES
Starting with earlier papers, one stream of research 
describes the sales phenomena as a temporary price 
discrimination, explained by alternating consumer 
preferences and tastes, otherwise defined as the im-
perfect knowledge on prices (Salop 1977; Salop and 
Stiglitz 1982). Research papers emphasise, that firms 
are motivated to apply the price discrimination, since 
some consumer groups are purchasing larger quan-
tities when prices are low, and store them at home, 
whilst the consumers with a higher willingness to pay 
make purchases according to their immediate needs 
(Conlisk et al. 1984; Sobel 1984; Pesendorfer 2002). 
Other branch of the literature considers firms fol-
lowing a mixed strategy in order to determine prices 
(Shilony 1977; Varian, 1980; Lal 1990; Lal and Villas-
Boas 1998). Most theoretical models within this group 
assume there are at least two or more different types 
of consumers, characterised by varying search costs. 
Several papers have highlighted the importance of 
search costs. As an example, Seiler (2012) found that 
in 70% of shopping trips, consumers are not aware 
of competing prices because of the search costs. 
Applying a counterfactual exercise, Seiler (2012) 
suggests that should the search costs be halved, the 
elasticity of demand may experience a threefold in-
crease. Generally, the literature considers the search 
cost of well-informed consumers being zero, whilst 
others facing substantial search costs. A number of 
empirically testable hypotheses may result from the 
sale theories. The paper closest to our research is 
Berck et al. (2008), empirically testing sale theories 
using the retail chain specific price data of the frozen 
and refrigerated orange juice, somewhat similar to the 
boxed and storable milk employed in this study. Thus 
in the following sections, we follow their example by 
briefly discussing the theory and empirical examples 
from the literature (where applicable) than formulate 
the hypotheses to be tested. 
Shilony (1977) and Varian (1980) discuss a static 
sales model with retailers pursuing a mixed strategy. 
In this model, sales are explained by the differences 
with respect to how well informed the consumers 
are. Since the consumers with a high willingness to 
pay make immediate purchases, the retailers com-
pete for the costumers only willing to buy when the 
prices are low. Thus the oligopolistic retailers offer 
homogenous products for sale, using a mixed strategy 
by determining the temporary low prices at a level 
that attracts these costumer groups. If we consider 
the process as a game, and repeat it independently 
during a number of periods, than the mixed strategy 
results an explicit price oscillation with a continuous 
probability distribution. Facing competition, firms 
are more likely to drop prices, rather than to follow 
a price discrimination strategy. Thus the following 
hypotheses arise:
Hypothesis 1. Price promotions induce specific price 
distribution on the market 
Hypothesis 1a. The distribution of prices is continu-
ous (most likely bell shaped) 
Conlisk et al. (1984), shows that the sales of durable 
(e.g. UHT milk) products can be a useful tool of the 
price discrimination against eager costumers char-
acterised by an inelastic demand. In the monopolies 
model of Conlisk et al. (1984), the retailers employ 
a cyclical pricing strategy. Periodical discounts are 
aimed at the consumers with relatively low reservation 
prices, whilst the periods characterised by high prices 
are for the consumers with relatively high reservation 
prices. Other relevant research (e.g. Stokey 1979 and 
1981) analyses the temporary price drops, i.e. the inter-
1Data from Hungarian Central Statistical Agency.
2Throughout this paper, we use boxed and perishable milk as synonyms. Similarly, UHT, storable and durable milk are 
also interchangeable terms is this research.
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temporary price discrimination of durable products. 
These models, however, do not explain the phenomena 
of temporary price promotions. Sobel (1984) augments 
the Conlisk et al. (1984) model with a fixed number 
of retailers, offering homogenous products. Here, 
the consumers differ from each other with respect to 
their preferences towards the homogenous product. 
In every period they enter, purchase the product, and 
then leave the market. Sellers adjust prices to their 
will, maintaining a high price level for most of the 
period, however, occasionally discounting prices in 
order to fulfil the needs of the relatively numerous 
group of the low reservation price costumers. The 
crucial assumption of the model is that the consumers 
possess different rates of shopping time preferences 
that correlate with the intensity of their preferences. 
Another important characteristic of the model is 
that all retail units drop their prices simultaneously to 
the very same level. At the beginning, the retailers set 
prices to higher levels and focus on loyal customers 
with high storage costs3. As the time passes, a sig-
nificant number of customers with low storage costs 
enter the market, therefore it is profitable to discount 
prices and compete for these costumers. The prices 
are then increased again, and a new cycle begins. 
Further, in the Pesendorfer’s (2002) model two 
distinct groups of costumers are assumed. The first 
group consumes a unit of product in every period, and 
does not store it, whilst the second group stores the 
product, and consumes it when the prices are high. 
Those who store, only purchase the product if the 
price falls below a certain threshold. We formulate 
the next Hypothesis as:
Hypothesis 1b. Prices have a smooth distribution 
with a mass point at the highest price
Most price discrimination and sale models are 
rooted in the games theory and implicitly or explic-
itly assume the price discounts being determined at 
the manufacturer level. The massive concentration 
process of the retailing sector during the past two 
decades emphasised the increasing market power of 
retailers with respect to the processors, casting some 
doubts with respect to this assumption. More, the 
empirical results of Villa-Boas (2007) and Berck et 
al. (2008) show that it is more likely for the retailers 
to determine prices rather than the manufacturers. 
Further, Lal (1990) and Pesendorfer (2002) conclude 
that processors motivations’ to initiate price pro-
motions at the retail level is rather weak, and thus 
potentially easily ignored. Thus we expect to reject 
the Hypothesis defined as:
Hypothesis 2. Retail prices are more likely to be 
determined by processors rather than retailers 
There are a number of competing theory predic-
tions with respect to the timing of sales by retail-
ers. According to Shilony (1977) and Varian (1980), 
timing of sales is random between competing firms. 
Pesendorfer (2002) predicts that the probability of 
price promotions increases with the time passed since 
the last sale, whilst Sobel (1984) suggests that the 
retailers drop their prices simultaneously. In addi-
tion, it is an interesting question whether the retailers 
follow each other’s price promotions. The question 
we ask is, does the timing of sales at a given retailer 
influence the decision of a competing outlet to go on 
the sale with the respective product? Accordingly, we 
formulate four hypotheses with respect to the timing 
of sales across firms:
Hypothesis 3a. Timing of sales is random between 
competing firm 
Hypothesis 3b. The probability of discounts increases 
with the time passed since the last sale action
Hypothesis 3c. The timing of sales at a given retailer 
influences the timing of competing retailers 
Hypothesis 3d. Retailers drop their prices simul-
taneously
Should indeed the processors rather than retailers 
determine price discounts, and the price sensitive 
consumers prefer certain brands, then the periodical, 
however rare, price promotions squeeze these con-
sumers out of the market, shifting their preferences 
towards purchasing durable goods (should they exist). 
Such a strategy is not acceptable for those costumers, 
which cannot store products at home. In the Varian’s 
(1980) model, the timing of sales for the homogenous, 
not durable products is considered to be random. The 
theories of Sobel (1984) and Pesendorfer (2002) state 
with respect to durable goods that the price changes 
are predictable, thus at first a smooth price decrease 
is experienced, followed by a sudden increase, and 
the cycle re-begins. In addition, Pesendorfer (2002) 
concludes that the probability for durable goods to 
go on sale increases with the time passed since the 
last discount. Thus our last Hypothesis aims to test:
Hypothesis 4. The price distribution may vary with 
durability of goods
3The storage costs and their implication upon consumer demand and retailer pricing strategy is emphasized (amongst 
others) by Bell and Hilber (2006).
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For the empirical application, we use data supplied 
by the Research Institute of Agricultural Economics 
(RIAE). The weekly retail prices for 1 litre (2.8% fat) 
boxed milk and 1 litre (2.8% fat) durable UHT milk 
observed in 8 major retail chains (Auchan, CBA, 
Coop, Cora, Interspar, Metro, Plus, Tesco) are used 
for the empirical analysis. The time span is between 
January 2005, and 36th week of 2008, totalling 192 
observations per product and retail chain. 
Empirical approaches of sales analysis
Since the data does not come labelled depending 
whether in a given period the price is a sale price or 
regular price, we first need to define these terms. 
Following the empirical literature (e.g. Lloyd et al. 
2009), we define the regular price for a specific good 
as its modal price during the analysed period. This 
approach implicitly assumes that a product has a 
single regular price each period. To compare price 
variation within and across categories, it is useful to 
divide a specific product’s price by a measure of the 
respective price’s central tendency. The fact that the 
empirical distributions have significant mass points 
suggests that the appropriate measure of the central 
tendency is a product’s annual mode. Therefore, we 
define the scaled prices ( ) as: 
mod,j
jt
jt r
r
P        
where rjt is the price (as reported by the RIAE) of 
product j in the week t, and rj, mode is the modal rice 
of product j in the year that contains the week.
The next step is to assess, whether most price re-
ductions are indeed temporary (see Pesendorfer 2002; 
Hosken and Reiffen 2004; Berck et al. 2008). Thus 
we examine the price changes between the week t 
and t + 1, conditional on price falling between weeks 
t − 1 and t. If a price reduction is temporary rather 
than permanent, then the price would rise between 
the week t and t + 1. Contrary, if the price change 
between the weeks t and t + 1 is zero (or negative), 
it would suggest that the retail price movement re-
flects a permanent change in the retailer’s cost (and/
or the manufacturer’s cost), thus the price decrease 
is permanent.
Table 1 shows that most of the time, price reduc-
tions are followed by price increases, for both boxed 
and storable milk products (43–48%). 
These results help us to create a useful definition of 
sales. Following Hosken and Reiffen (2004), we define 
a sale as occurring if the price falls by at least some 
fixed percentage (10 or 20%) between the periods 
t – 1 and t and then rises by at least that percentage 
between the period t and t + 1. Table 2 presents the 
frequency of sales using 10 and 20% threshold values. 
With 10% threshold 7–8 percent of observations may 
be classified as sales. This falls to a fraction, if the 
20% threshold is considered. 
Hypotheses tests
With respect to Hypothesis 1, Figures 1 and 2 pres-
ent the frequency distribution of the scaled boxed 
and durable milk prices. It is clear, the distribution is 
not bell shaped (Hypothesis 1a), and the mass point 
of prices is below the mode (Hypothesis 1b). Formal 
testing of the normal probability density distribution 
results chi(2) = 763.2 (p = 0.00) and chi(2) = 447.2 (p 
= 0.00) for boxed and durable milk prices respectively.
The second Hypothesis we test is whether indeed 
the processors rather than retailers determine the 
timing of price promotions. For a direct Hypothesis 
testing we would need the milk processor prices by 
the retail chain, which are not available, thus we follow 
an indirect approach4. If the processors determine the 
timing of sales, we expect these to occur in each retail 
chain independently, i.e. we expect low correlation 
Table 1. Direction of price changes following a price drop
% of observations when
there is price 
increase there is no change 
following a price fall
Durable milk 43,7 36,2
Boxed milk 48,3 31,3
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
Table 2. Percent of sales in the total observations using 
a 10 and 20% threshold respectively
Threshold 10 % 20 %
Boxed milk 7.8 1.6
Durable milk 7.3 0.0
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
4Our approach is somewhat similar to Carman and Sexton (2005) focusing on retailers’ competition with respect to 
fluid milk pricing.
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coefficients between the chain specific milk prices. If, 
however, the retailers decide when the boxed or UHT 
milk goes on sale, because of the competition, higher 
correlation coefficients are expected. Tables 3 and 4 
present the correlation coefficients of the boxed and 
durable milk prices among the retailers. As expected, 
the coefficients are positive, significant and relatively 
high albeit of a different magnitude. For example, in 
the case of the boxed milk prices it ranges between 
0.48 (Interspar and Cora) to 0.98 (Plus and Coop). 
Irrespective whether we consider the boxed or du-
rable milk prices, two clusters of retail outlets can 
be identified. The first cluster, displaying a strong 
price correlation (above 90%), includes smaller-sized 
supermarkets, mostly located in urban centres: the 
Coop, Match, CBA and Plus. Although all retail chains 
make an effort to publicise their sales promotions, 
most importantly through leaflets and throwaways 
delivered at the doorstep, the results emphasise the 
importance of the physical distance between the stores, 
with respect to the price discovery (lower search 
costs for shoppers). Milk prices of larger super and 
hypermarkets, less centrally located (Tesco, Auchan, 
Cora, Interspar) form the second cluster, displaying a 
weaker correlation. The lower correlation coefficients 
observed for the second cluster (where larger stores 
belong) may be explained by the higher search costs 
the costumers need to pay in order to compare prices. 
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of the boxed milk prices
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
Figure 2. Frequency distribution of the durable milk prices
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE
Table 3. Boxed milk price correlation coefficients
Correlation coeff.
Prob. Auchan CBA Cora Coop Interspar Match Plus Tesco
Auchan 1.000
p-value –
CBA 0.792 1.000
p-value 0.000 – 
Cora 0.793 0.792 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 – 
Coop 0.717 0.886 0.716 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Interspar 0.523 0.714 0.485 0.753 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Match 0.749 0.938 0.757 0.954 0.741 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Plus 0.728 0.904 0.732 0.985 0.748 0.9660 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Tesco 0.784 0.778 0.756 0.708 0.515 0.712 0.710 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
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To conclude, it seems more likely that the retailers 
rather than the processors determine the timing of 
sale promotions, by keeping an eye on their direct 
competitors’ prices. 
Next, we test the hypotheses with respect to the 
timing of sales. Strong correlation coefficients in 
Tables 3 and 4 reject the Hypothesis 3a, stating that 
the sale promotions are random events. In order to 
analyse how the past price promotions influence the 
present price drops (Hypothesis 3b. Past discounts 
determine present price promotions), we use a Probit 
regression. The dependent variable takes the value 
of 1, if in the corresponding week the product is on 
sale, and 0 otherwise. The main explanatory variable 
is the number of weeks elapsed between two price 
promotions. To account for the possible retail chain 
specific effects, the retail chain dummy variables 
were also included in the Probit regression. These 
dummy variables however proved to be insignificant, 
neither did they change the results. The simple, sig-
nificant model is presented in Table 5. The sign of 
the coefficient is negative for boxed and positive for 
the durable milk. The negative sign observed in the 
boxed milk regression emphasises that as the number 
of weeks between two price promotions increases, 
it is less likely for a price discount to happen in the 
given retail chain at the given week. The reason 
might be the rare occurrence of sale promotions (see 
Table 2), thus, if in the past a retail chain rarely went 
on sale with the boxed milk, then it is less likely to 
do so at present. However, we find a positive and 
significant coefficient of the explanatory variable 
for the durable milk confirming the Hypothesis 3b. 
To sum up, similarly to the findings of Berck et al. 
(2008), our results only partly support Pesendorfer’s 
(2002) predictions that the probability of price pro-
motions increases with the time passed since the last 
sale, also emphasising some differences between the 
perishable and durable milk prices. 
To assess Hypothesis 3c, we analyse whether the 
retail chains influence each other’s boxed and durable 
milk prices by estimating the Vector Auto Regression 
(VAR) models, followed by the Granger causality 
tests. Table 6 presents the causality results for the 
boxed milk prices, whilst Table 7 for the durable 
milk prices. The lag length was selected by the AIC 
information criteria, and it is ranging between 1 
and 3 weeks. 
Table 4. Durable milk price correlation coefficients
Correlation coeff.
Prob. Auchan CBA Cora Coop Interspar Match Plus Tesco
Auchan 1.000
p-value –
CBA 0.720 1.000
p-value 0.000 – 
Cora 0.814 0.730 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 – 
Coop 0.696 0.844 0.764 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Interspar 0.674 0.713 0.762 0.809 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Match 0.705 0.848 0.732 0.944 0.762 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Plus 0.651 0.820 0.742 0.969 0.807 0.949 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Tesco 0.850 0.765 0.812 0.739 0.727 0.728 0.701 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – 
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
Table 5. Probit model: probability of sale of the boxed 
and durable milk
Boxed milk Durable milk
No. of weeks since 
the last sale –0.009* 0.025***
Constant –1.402*** –1.715***
Pseudo R2 0.0020 0.0229
N 1392 1504
* and *** represent 10% and 1% significance level respectively
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
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In line with the correlation results, a cluster of ‘large’ 
hypermarkets, and a cluster of ‘smaller’, centrally 
located supermarkets can be identified with respect 
to the causality results. At 5% level of significance, 
for the boxed milk, there are causality relationships 
between the ‘large’ retailers, the Auchan, Cora and 
Tesco (bidirectional between the Auchan and Cora, 
unidirectional from the Cora to Tesco and Tesco to 
Auchan), and mostly a bidirectional causality between 
the’smaller’ retailers, the Coop, Plus, CBA, Match and 
to some extent the Interspar. The boxed milk prices 
of the Interspar are weakly exogenous, the price vari-
able being influenced only by its past values. Yet the 
boxed milk prices of the Interspar do cause pricing 
in the CBA, Cora, Coop, Plus – most retail chains. 
For the durable milk, the dual cluster of retailers is 
less obvious. Amongst the ‘large’ retailers, a bidirec-
tional causality between the Tesco and Auchan, uni-
directional (bi-directional at 10%) from the Auchan 
to Cora is recorded. The Tesco prices are, however, 
influenced by the Interspar prices, whilst the Match 
present exogenous prices, dependent only by its past 
values. The price of the durable milk in the Cora 
causes most supermarket’s (Auchan, CBA, Interspar 
and Plus) durable milk prices. Similarly to the boxed 
milk results, there is mostly a bidirectional causality 
relationship among the smaller sized retail chains. It 
needs to be mentioned, however, that the results are 
sensitive to the lag length choice, in turn dependent 
on the information criteria used. In sum, based on 
the results, we cannot reject the null Hypothesis that 
the timing of sales at the given retailer influences the 
timing of sales at the competing retailers.
According to the Hypothesis 3d, price promotions 
happen simultaneously across the retail chains. We 
may handle the Hypothesis 3d from two directions. 
First, the Hypothesis of parallel discounts may easily 
be rejected by counting the number of simultaneous 
sale promotions over the period. Using 20% level, 
there are only 3 cases when minimum two retail 
chains were dropping prices at the same time. Using a 
10% threshold with respect to price reductions, not a 
single case of the simultaneous sale promotion can be 
identified. Second, the timing of sales can be analysed 
deeper from a different perspective, using the time 
series properties of the data. If there are some link-
ages between the price reductions of the individual 
retail chains, we would expect the prices to move 
together on the long run, or using the econometric 
term, to co-integrate. Two or more time series are 
Table 7. Granger causality tests for the durable milk prices
Retail 
chain
Does not 
Granger cause Retail chain Prob.*
Auchan → Cora 0.0039
→ Plus 0.0919
→ Tesco 0.0000
CBA → Tesco 0.0073
Cora → Auchan 0.0658
→ CBA 0.0313
→ Interspar 0.0271
→ Plus 0.0381
COOP → Plus 0.0635
Interspar → Cora 0.0358
→ Plus 0.0140
→ Tesco 0.0457
Match → COOP 0.0358
→ Plus 0.0000
Plus → CBA 0.0759
Tesco → Auchan 0.0001
* Null hypothesis: price of a given good in retail chain X 
does not cause the price of an identical product in retail 
chain Y. Only results with p < 0.1 are presented. 
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
Table 6. Granger causality tests for the boxed milk prices
Retail 
chain
Does not 
Granger cause Retail chain Prob.*
Auchan → Cora 0.0028
CBA → Auchan 0.0036
→ Match 0.0250
Cora → Auchan 0.0355
→ Tesco 0.0078
COOP → Plus 0.0426
Interspar → CBA 0.0235
→ Cora 0.0264
→ COOP 0.0147
→ Plus 0.0537
Match → CBA 0.0023
→ COOP 0.0189
→ Plus 0.0057
Plus → Match 0.0119
Tesco → Auchan 0.0456
→ CBA 0.0263
* Null hypothesis: price of a given good in retail chain X 
does not cause the price of an identical product in retail 
chain Y. Only results with p < 0.1 are presented.
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
5For a detailed discussion of the unit root tests and integration see for example Maddala and Kim (1998).
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co-integrated (CI) if there is (are) empirically test-
able long-run relationship(s) between them. First 
step of the co-integration analysis is to test the order 
of integration of the individual series, i.e. whether 
they contain the unit root or not. There are a large 
number of the unit root test in the literature5, here 
we employed the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test, and the Perron’s test, the latter being capable 
to account for the possible structural breaks in the 
data generation process. To clearly determine the 
order of integration, the first difference of variables 
was also tested. Two deterministic specifications, the 
constant and constant and trend, were used in the 
test equation, where the lag lengths were determined 
by the AIC criteria. 
After a careful examination of the ADF and Perron 
unit root test statistics6, we conclude that all milk 
price time series are non-stationary, i.e. contain a 
unit root. The finding that all price series are non-
stationary may be translated that the milk prices do 
not have any constant mean and/or variance in time, 
but these values are the function of the retailers’ cur-
rent marketing strategy. 
Next, we use the Johansen approach to test for co-
integration between the boxed (Table 8) and durable 
milk prices (Table 9) observed at each retailer. The 
tables present the number of hypothesised co-integra-
tion vectors, the Eigen value of maximum likelihood 
estimator, the trace statistic (test statistic), the 5% 
critical value, and finally the probability of rejecting 
the null of given CI vectors. The results emphasise the 
existence of a long-run relationship between the boxed 
milk prices (Table 8). At 5% level of significance 4, at 
10% 5 CI vectors can be identified. The durable milk 
prices (Table 9) are co-integrated with 2 vectors. A 
higher number of CI vectors may be translated onto a 
stronger long-run relationship between the variables, 
thus the results show a stronger in-between boxed 
milk prices relationship than between its durable 
counterpart. This may be explained on one hand by 
the perishability of the boxed milk, resulting in the 
faster product rotation on shelves, and on the other 
hand by more accentuated sales marketing in the 
case of the UHT milk. 
Hypothesis 4 states that the price distribution de-
pends on the durability of the product. Having both 
the durable (UHT) and perishable (boxed) milk prices 
in the dataset, our sample is appropriate to test the 
hypothesis. On Figures 1 and 2, there is no evidence 
of any significant difference between the two prices 
6Unit root test results were not included in the paper to save space, however, they are available upon request.
Table 9. Johansen co-integration test of the durable 
milk price
No. of CI 
vectors
Eigen 
value
Trace 
statistic
5% critical 
value Prob.*
Null 0.329580 222.5254 169.5991 0.0000
Maximum 1 0.258447 146.5537 134.6780 0.0083
Maximum 2 0.189292 89.74196 103.8473 0.2942
Maximum 3 0.093766 49.87102 76.97277 0.8572
Maximum 4 0.070082 31.16395 54.07904 0.8767
Maximum 5 0.053064 17.35871 35.19275 0.8707
Maximum 6 0.026347 6.999293 20.26184 0.8973
Maximum 7 0.010087 1.926261 9.164546 0.7923
 MacKinnon et al. (1999) p-values
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
Table 8. Johansen co-integration test of the boxed milk 
prices
No. of CI 
vectors
Eigen 
value
Trace 
statistic
5% critical 
value Prob
.*
Zero 0.338 285.626 169.599 0.0000
Maximum 1 0.286 207.065 134.678 0.0000
Maximum 2 0.238 142.969 103.847 0.0000
Maximum 3 0.192 91.207 76.972 0.0028
Maximum 4 0.114 50.613 54.079 0.0984
Maximum 5 0.089 27.589 35.192 0.2602
Maximum 6 0.042 9.750 20.261 0.6643
Maximum 7 0.008 1.567 9.164 0.8611
*MacKinnon et al. (1999) p-values
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
Table 10. Difference in proportion of pricing distribution 10% (20%) above mode to 10% (20%) below mode
10% Z test 20% Z testbelow mode above mode below mode above mode
Boxed milk 20.5 31.3 0.000 6.4 18.2 0.000
Durable milk 23.4 23.6 0.911 6.4 16.2 0.000
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
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from this respect. We formally test the asymmetry of 
the price distribution by examining the proportion of 
prices above and below the mode. Specifically, if price 
promotions are an important component of the price 
variation, we would expect to see more deviations 
below the mode than above it. We apply this test by 
examining two typical levels of price promotions a 
10% or more and a 20% or more reduction from the 
regular (modal) price. We calculate the difference 
between the proportion of prices 10% (20%) above 
the mode and the proportion of prices 10% (20%) 
below the mode. Estimations confirm the graphical 
analysis (Table 10). The prices are much more likely 
to be above than below the mode. The asymmetry is 
significant with both threshold values (10 and 20%). 
To conclude, we observe an upward asymmetry for 
all cases, except the durable milk with 10% cutting 
value, where the price distribution is symmetric. To 
conclude, when 10% threshold is used, we cannot 
reject Hypothesis 4, however, using a 20% threshold, 
there is evident a price distribution between the boxed 
and storable milk prices.
In order to investigate more in-depth Hypothesis 4, 
we may again exploit the more robust results offered 
by panel analysis techniques. By building a panel 
database, we have 8 categories, 194 time points, i.e. 
1544 observations by variable (note we now have two 
variables left, boxed and durable milk price). Table 11 
summarises the panel unit root test results for the 
boxed milk prices and Table 12 for the durable milk 
prices. The first column of both tables presents the 
type of the test, the second the probability of rejecting 
the unit root null with only the constant specification 
and the third column the same probability but with 
the constant and trend specification. 
For the boxed milk, all test results emphasise the 
presence of the panel unit roots, regardless of the 
deterministic specification. For the durable milk, 
most test results also show a panel unit root in the 
time series. With the constant & trend specification, 
the test result depends on whether the individual or 
common process is assumed. Based on the results in 
Tables 11 and 12, we consider both series as contain-
ing one panel unit root. Although not the focus of 
Hypothesis 4, the existence of a unit root in a panel 
setting is an evidence that the price series included 
are not converging to a common equilibrium on the 
long-run. Next, we proceed to the panel co-integration 
tests. A number of different tests were employed, and 
the results are displayed in Table 13. 
The null of no panel co-integration between the 
boxed and durable milk prices is strongly rejected by 
all tests. Thus there is a strong evidence of the panel 
co-integration, i.e. there is a long-run relationship 
between the boxed milk and the UHT milk prices. 
Whilst not directly comparable, panel CI results in 
contradicting the findings emerging from Table 10 
with 10% threshold and the previous support find-
ings using the 20% threshold. It follows that there 
are connections between the price distribution of the 
durable and non-durable goods, however, the mixed 
results obtained do not allow us to clearly reject or 
do not reject Hypothesis 4. 
Table 13. Panel co-integration tests between the boxed 
and durable milk prices
Test/statistic Test statistic Prob.*
Kao
ADF –1.968 0.024
Pedroni
Panel v-statistic  3.296 0.001
Panel rho-statistic –39.376 0.000
Panel PP-statistic –17.234 0.000
Panel ADF-statistic –20.492 0.000
*Null hypothesis: no panel co-integration
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
Table 12. Panel unit root tests of the durable milk prices
Test Prob. (constant)
Prob. 
(constant & trend)
Null: Unit root (assuming common process) 
Levin–Lin–Chu t 0.308 0.974 
Breitung t-stat – 0.999
Null: Unit root (assuming individual process)
Im–Pesaran–Shin W-stat  0.230 0.012
ADF–Fisher χ2 0.553 0.000
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE
Table 11. Panel unit root tests of the boxed milk prices
Test Prob. (constant)
Prob. 
(constant & trend)
Null: Unit root (assuming common process) 
Levin–Lin–Chu t 0.469 0.999 
Breitung t-stat – 1.000
Null: Unit root (assuming individual process) 
Im–Pesaran–Shin W-stat  0.194 0.1431
ADF-Fisher χ2 0.508 0.110
Source: Own calculations, data from the RIAE 
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CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we empirically tested four main groups 
of sale theory hypotheses using the store level price 
data for two distinct milk products, a perishable and 
a durable one. Our most important results can be 
summarized as follows:
First, the price distribution suggests that we may 
reject the predictions of all competing theories such as 
Varian (1980), or Sobel et al. (1984), and Salop (1977).
Second, the empirical results do not support the 
Hypothesis common for most sale theories that the 
processors determine price promotions. Instead, 
there is the evidence that the retailers decide when 
to go on sale, and they closely follow the actions of 
their competitors.
Third, we could not find any conclusive evidence 
for the either the randomness or simultaneity of sales 
promotions. We have also rejected the Pesendorfer’s 
(2002) Hypothesis that the probability of sales pro-
motions increases with the number of weeks passed 
since the last discounting action. Instead, the analysis 
supports the Hypothesis that the retailers alternate 
the sale promotions of the national brands (Lal 1990).
Fourth, the empirical analysis could not find any 
significant differences between the distributions of 
the boxed and durable milk prices. The frequency 
of sale promotions is nearly identical irrespective 
of the threshold percent used to define sales. The 
panel co-integration results reinforce this finding, 
by emphasising the long-run relationship between 
the prices of durable and non-durable milk. Thus it 
seems the durability property of products does not 
play any role in this respect as one would expect 
based on Sobel (1984) or Conlisk et al. (1984) theo-
retical models. 
The fact that the individual series are non-stationary, 
yet there is a co-integration (i.e. long-run relation-
ship between them) regardless of the simple or panel 
setting employed, and the high number of common 
structural break points (emerged as by-product of the 
Perron testing) for the retailers suggests that although 
the sale promotions do not occur simultaneously, 
the retailers closely follow each other’s sale promo-
tions and act accordingly. Our conclusion is that the 
existing price promotions models are only partially 
consistent with some empirical aspects of sales, and 
none of the models can fully explain all important 
aspects of the retail price formation. As with many 
economic phenomena it is likely that more complex 
theoretical models (e.g. the inclusion of purchased 
quantities) are needed to more accurately predict the 
retailers’ behaviour with respect to price promotions.
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